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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes that a national mineral policy (“NMP”) can be crafted 
to generate foreign direct investment (“FDI”) and strengthen sustainable 
development goals. Less-developed countries (“LDCs”) typically overlook or 
underestimate this federal policy imperative while seeking to harness mineral 
resources.
1
 Creation of a NMP and complementary changes to federal mining 
investment laws can provide host countries increased opportunities as well as 
autonomy to profit from their own natural resources and, at the same time, 
 
* Nadia B. Ahmad, Legal Fellow, Sustainable Development Strategies Group, LL.M. University of 
Denver; J.D. University of Florida; B.A. University of California at Berkeley. A debt of gratitude to Professors 
Luke Danielson and Cecilia Dalupan of the University of Denver and Dr. Ana Elizabeth Bastida of the 
University of Dundee for their comments and encouragement. Special thanks to Diane Burkhardt, Joan 
Policastri, Jane Dugger, and the staff of the Westminster Law Library. Sincere appreciation to Akmal and Senan 
as well as my parents and my siblings for their love and support.  
1. See infra Parts I-IV. 
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investor nations can benefit from a NMP because of further mining prospects.2 
This Article goes on to discuss how the formulation and implementation of a 
NMP can work to actualize sustainable development goals for LDCs.3 Typically, 
even a well-intentioned NMP may afford only superficial sustenance to 
subsurface investment projects because of the presently inadequate investment 
regime for extractive industries. If, however, LDCs develop and implement 
NMPs with investment safeguards for trade and export with foreign investors and 
multinational enterprises, then the countries can begin to more fully reap the 
rewards of previously stalled mining enterprise ventures.4 
By way of example, I will explore how the world’s second largest known 
gold reserves, located in the Central Asian state of Tajikistan, remain unearthed 
because of a precautionary and highly administrative approach to international 
investment law. With a NMP, Tajikistan can improve its national standing in the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) as a member nation. The development of a 
NMP in Tajikistan can be effectuated by contextualizing historical happenings of 
nation building and conflict to advance macro-level international investment law 
and policy.5 Part I will provide an economic and political snapshot to natural 
resource development in Tajikistan. Part II will coalesce overlapping goals of 
mining enterprises and international investment for sustainable development. 
Finally, Part III will show how to create a framework for international investment 
law and policy to facilitate an advantageous NMP for host countries. The case of 
Tajikistan’s unearthed gold reserves will demonstrate why the making of a NMP 
is crucial not only in the case of Tajikistan, but other mineral-rich LDCs, to 
augment FDI for mining enterprises. 
II. TAJIKISTAN: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SNAPSHOT 
This section will provide an overview of economic and political happenings 
that limit mineral exploration and production in Tajikistan. The rugged terrain 
and the complications in communication have historically impeded the 
development of a Tajik national identity because different parts of the country 
rarely interacted.6 Its rapid escalation to independence also prevented national 
leadership from preparing for the country’s future.7 In the late 1980s, the 
openness of the Soviet regime of Mikhail S. Gorbachev sparked a nationalist 
 
2. See infra Part I. 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. Anna Matveeva, The Perils of Emerging Statehood: Civil War and State Reconstruction in Tajikistan, 
in CRISIS STATES WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 2 1, 4 (2009), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=98292. 
7. Id. at 16. 
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movement in Tajikistan, forcing Tajik leaders to declare sovereignty in 1991 with 
the invariable dissolution of the Soviet Union.8 Tensions between the Russian 
government, reform-minded Tajiks, and extremists still run deep.9 An 
authoritative NMP for Tajikistan would account for these elements as well for 
volatile economic considerations. 
A.  Regional Instability and Power Struggles in Tajikistan 
Economic activity in Tajikistan increased at an average rate of 8.6% from the 
period of 2000-2008 according to figures from the World Bank,10 but the gross 
domestic product (“GDP”) fell to 6.5% in 2010,11 7.4% in 2011,12 and 6.0% in 
2012.13 To continue a more distinct upward trend in GDP, Tajikistan needs to 
balance its national goal of prosperity with an aim at sustainable development in 
light of its accession to the WTO.14 Following its independence in 1991 and the 
ensuing civil war, the nation building process and development goals moved 
forward with the help of foreign aid, FDI, non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”), relief agencies, missionary groups, and the country’s own 
development efforts for the past two decades.15 Tajikistan is carving a place for 
itself on the global market, but continues to be the poorest in the former Soviet 
sphere.16 Economic development and security assistance have been expanding 
from the international community since the beginning of the NATO intervention 
in Afghanistan, creating jobs and strengthening long-term stability.17 
In LDCs, like Tajikistan, the political institutions are actually part of the 
development problem, and they “are usually only partially, and to differing 
 
8. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, COUNTRY PROFILE: TAJIKISTAN 8 (Jan. 2007), 
available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/ Tajikistan.pdf. 
9. See, e.g., Daniel Tovrov, Russia Deports 300 Tajiks; Political Tensions Stew, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-deports-300-tajiks-political-
tensions-stew-370240. 
10. Tajikistan: Country Brief 2011, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/TAJIKISTANEXTN/0.contentMDK:20630697~menuPK:287255~pagePK:141137~pi
PK:141127~theSitePK:258744,00.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
11. The U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Central and South Asian States, collects data on GDP for 
purposes of foreign diplomacy. Background Note: Tajikistan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5775.htm.  
12. Tajikistan Country Report, GLOBAL FIN., http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/165-
tajikistan-gdp-country-report.html#axzz2AYMMvi4L (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
13. Id. Figures for 2012 represent an estimate by Global Finance. 
14. See Tajikistan Moves One More Step Towards Membership, WTO (July 5, 2011), http://www.wto.org 
/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_tjk_05jul11_e.htm. 
15. Environmental Performance Review: Tajikistan, U.N. Econ. Comm. For Europe: Comm. on Environmental 
Policy 11 (2004), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/epr/epr_studies/ tajikistan.pdf. 
16. Introduction: Tajikistan, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
countrytemplate_ti.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2011). 
17. Id. 
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degrees, capable of analyzing, evaluating and solving the economic, socio-
cultural and foreign-policy problems faced by these nations.”18 A lack of 
institutionalization of the political system contributes to the overarching 
development problem.19 Social contradictions also weaken existing political 
institutions, because “class differences, ethnic diversity and cultural dualism” 
impede “the mineral cohesion that is a precondition for the functioning of such 
political institutions.”20 International investment laws must account for these 
social obstacles in formulating mineral policies. 
B. Accession to WTO Membership 
Tajikistan has reached a critical juncture through its WTO membership, and 
its government officials remain committed to integrating the world economy and 
the WTO.21 Tajikistan has undertaken major institutional and structural reforms, 
notably in its finance and banking system, so that it now trades with ninety 
different countries.22 However, no institutional changes have occurred to account 
for sustainable development strategies in the mining sector. Over the past two 
years, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) continues its assistance to the 
government of Tajikistan to implement policies geared to maintaining ongoing 
economic improvements.23 The IMF Extended Credit Facility (“ECF”) program 
along with grants from the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, and 
the World Bank have provided support to Tajikistan so that it can satisfy its 
external financing needs.24 Even still, compared to other Central Asian countries 
and international benchmarks, foreign exchange reserves in Tajikistan remain 
relatively low.25 
Meanwhile, Tajikistan’s mountainous regions are suitable for the mining and 
exploration of untapped precious metals, particularly gold. An accurate 
assessment of the resource base may encourage the national government to allow 
greater autonomy and a larger share of resource revenues, depending on whether 
resources are relatively small compared to those of the nation as a whole or if 
 
18. CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—PART 1: INTERESTS, 
BARGAINING PROCESS, LEGAL CONCEPTS 41 (1979). 
19. Id. at 42. 
20. Id. 
21. WTO, supra note 14. 
22. Id. 
23. IMF, Tajikistan: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) for 2011-12 39 (2012), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1232.pdf. 
24. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK GROUP—PROGRAM PARTNERSHIP SNAPSHOT 27 (Apr. 2013), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam /Worldbank/document/Tajikistan-Snapshot.pdf. 
25. IMF, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA 60 (Apr. 2011), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2011/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo0411.pdf. 
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resources are already seriously depleted.26 A realistic assessment of resource 
reserves shows that resource extraction alone is not a viable basis for the entire 
regional economy.27 An initial step critical to the process of attracting foreign 
investment for mineral extraction is to begin a modern geological survey with 
funding, perhaps by the World Bank, to establish a solid general geologic and 
geophysical database that identifies areas of mineral potential.28 The most 
common way for a country to promote its mineral wealth and positive investment 
climate is to have a large, significant mineral deposit developed by a foreign 
company.29 This first development of a major mining operation is crucial because 
it proves to the global mining industry that a foreign company in the country can 
mine a deposit.30 
III. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, FDI, AND MINING 
Increasing numbers of large mining companies are seeking to incorporate 
sustainable development principles in their corporate practices.31 Sustainable 
development, as defined in Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland 
Report, “is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”32 
Despite the consensus of FDI for sustainable development, there is a gap between 
the existing regulatory framework for international investment laws and norms 
that advocate sustainability.33 International investment agreements have great 
 
26. Siri Aas Rustad et al., Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from the Management of High-Value 
Natural Resources, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10546, 10547 (2012). “During the 2005 peace 
negotiations between Aceh and the Indonesian government, for example, the depletion of Aceh’s reserves made 
wealth-sharing between the government of Indonesia and Aceh less relevant—which probably contributed to 
the Indonesian government’s willingness to grant Aceh better terms, with respect to revenue-sharing from oil 
and gas exploitation in Aceh.” Id. 
27. Id. “[E]ven the central government may have inaccurate perceptions of resource reserves and of what 
can be achieved with them, and may therefore fail to develop other sectors of the economy. The government 
budget of Southern Sudan (now South Sudan), for example, has been financed almost entirely by oil revenues; 
unless the country is able to develop the non-oil sectors of its economy, a decline in those revenues would 
jeopardize its economic viability as an independent state.” Id. 
28. E-mail from Mark T. Nesbitt, Of Counsel, Fognani & Faught, PLLC to Nadia B. Ahmad, Legal 
Fellow, Sustainable Development Strategies Group, (Aug. 1, 2011, 08:16 A.M.) (on file with author). 
29. Id.; Tony Killick, The Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment and its Alternatives: An Empirical 
Exploration, 9 J. OF DEV. STUD. 301, 301-02 (1973) (discussing the benefits derived in mineral activities by the 
host economy from the activities and investment of foreign-owned companies). 
30. Nesbitt, supra note 28. 
31. Heledd Jenkins & Natalia Yakovleva, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining Industry: 
Exploring Trends in Social and Environmental Disclosure, 14 J. OF CLEANER PRODUCTION 271, 273 (2006), 
available at http://www.academia.edu/3375037/Corporate_social_responsibility_in_the_mining_industry_ 
exploring_trends_in_social_and_environmental_disclosure. 
32. Brundtland Report, Report of the World Commission on Environmental & Development: Our 
Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Oct. 1987). 
33. Markus Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, An Introduction to Sustainable Development in World 
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potential to promote sustainable development norms and fulfill their ultimate 
objective to protect international investment regimes.34 The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) was established in 1964 to 
support the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the 
world economy.35 UNCTAD has progressively evolved into an authoritative 
knowledge-based institution to help shape current policy debates and thinking on 
development, with an acute focus on ensuring that domestic policies and 
international action are mutually supportive in bringing about sustainable 
development.36 The efficient use of natural resources along with the protection of 
health and the environment requires a wide array of policies and regulations.37 
International and regional norms work with national and sub-national laws to 
establish a broad set of legal rules.38 Broadly speaking, interstitial modifying 
norms are used to regulate government conduct, but do not provide an objective 
measure for accountability mechanisms for mining enterprises.39 A NMP would 
provide a conceptual framework for legal norms governing mineral enterprises. 
London-based Kryso Resources PLC (“Kryso”) is an AIM-listed mineral 
exploration and development company that focuses on projects in Tajikistan.40 It 
is the only foreign company that has been granted permits at the time of this 
publication to explore Tajikistan’s gold reserves.41 Since Kryso is the first major 
foreign investor in the Tajikistan gold mining sector, its investment presents 
opportunities and challenges. Developing, exploring, and extracting Tajikistan’s 
gold reserves can incorporate sustainable development to attract investors both 
 
Investment Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 1, 9 (Marie-Claire Cordonier 
Segger et al. eds., 2011). 
34. Id. at 9-10. 
35. About UNCTAD, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
UNCTAD functions as a forum for intergovernmental deliberations for consensus building. It also undertakes 
research, policy analysis and data collection for the debates of government representatives and experts and 
offers technical assistance tailored to the specific requirements of developing countries with special attention to 
the needs of the least developed countries and of economies in transition. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Asa Romson, International Investment Law and the Environment, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 33, at 43. 
38. See id. Civil and criminal laws interact to play a significant role in the development of the country’s 
administrative laws. A common way to arrange administrative components of health and environmental laws is 
to divide the instruments into three major categories: direct regulation or “command and control,” economic 
incentives, and information-based or voluntary approaches. Id. 
39. Ulrich Beyerlin, Sustainable Development, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, para. 16, (2009), available at http://www.mpepil.com/sample_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690 
-e1609&recno=9&. 
40. About Us, KRYSO, http://www.kryso.com/About%20Us.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). AIM is the 
London Stock Exchange’s market for smaller and growing companies. 
41. Dilafruz Nabiyeva, Britain’s Kryso Resources Starts Developing Pakrut Gold Deposit in Tajikistan, 
CENTRAL ASIA ONLINE (May 9, 2012), available at http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/ 
main/2012/05/09/feature-02. 
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foreign and domestic. While stakeholder engagement and education are 
imperative, having an authoritative NMP would be critical for sustainable 
international investment in the mining sector.42 A revamped geological study 
would be the next critical step for attracting FDI.43 The World Bank could 
provide initial funding for this study.44 
Tajikistan’s present federal laws permit ways for foreign investors to 
participate in the market, but are inadequate to protect the country’s development 
goals. Articles 4 and 5 of the Law on Foreign Investment in the Republic of 
Tajikistan provide the parameters for foreign investors to invest in the country.45 
However, definitional standards in Articles 4 and 5 are overly broad and 
contextually vague for project details.46 Tajikistan’s investment laws do not 
address the wide investment scope for mining projects that involve complex 
issues related to real property, land use, pollution, environmental toxins, and 
mineral rights. 
A viable NMP could improve FDI in Tajikistan’s mining sector and 
simultaneously preserve its national interests. The rate of progress for 
implementation of national legislation regarding mining has been slow.47 This lull 
in advancement can be linked to a lack of political consensus on key issues.48 The 
formulation of an NMP encourages discussions, cooperation, and agreement 
among politicians, government administrators, and the private sector and lays the 
framework for effective regulatory reform.49 Each country has its own set of 
social, political, economic, and legal factors to consider when formulating a 
NMP. Political factors, such as interested government agencies and private sector 
groups, set the agenda for global economic policy.50 
International investment law is a building block of the global economy.51 
Foreign investment occurs in settings that require international cooperation 
because of the involvement of the host nation as a state actor.52 The government 
and its legal system establish institutions that sustain a functioning economy, 
while simultaneously imposing constraints on the government’s power to 
regulate and interfere in economic activities. As such, the formulation of a NMP 
 
42. See infra Part IV. 
43. Nesbitt, supra note 28. 
44. Id. 
45. Law on Foreign Investment in the Republic of Tajikistan, Arts. 4-5, available at http://www. 
tajinvest.tj/downloads/eng_zakon/3.pdf. 
46. See id. 
47. James M. Otto, A National Mineral Policy as a Regulatory Tool, 23 RESOURCES POL’Y 1 (1997). 
48. Id at 1. 
49. Id at 1-2. 
50. Id at 2-3. 
51. See generally STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW (2009). 
52. Id. at 3.  
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will incorporate development goals and development planning. In the 1990s, 
senior mining companies started publishing corporate responsibility policies 
discussing environmental, health and safety, and community issues.53 These 
policies ranged from strong to weak.54 The weaker policies contained relatively 
general pledges, whereas the stronger policies provided more active commitment 
engagement, such as the recognition of the need for local consultation and 
community development.55 
Foreign companies seeking to invest in Tajikistan’s gold mining industry 
would likely have to incorporate such techniques for community development. In 
fact, the government should require a certain standard for environmental, health 
and safety, and community issues for FDI projects. The formulation and 
implementation of concrete government goals for economic and social 
developments are necessary.56 Development goals vary widely, but can  include 
growth of gross national product and per capita income, expansion of regional 
infrastructure, diversification of industrial structure, promotion of import-
substituting industries, promotion of industries for export, creation of 
employment, administrative restructuring and reforms, improvement of the 
educational system, redistribution of national income, and promotion and 
dynamization of agricultural production.57 These development goals account for 
competing interests, infrastructure, and industries for mining ventures in 
developing nations. As broad as these goals may be, they represent the 
complexity on the national and local levels for FDI in newly independent, 
developing countries. 
In 1998, nine of the world’s biggest mining companies operating within the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (“WBCSD”) collaborated 
to create a joint agenda to tackle “the industry’s reputational, environmental and 
social concerns under the rubric of sustainable development” to form a group 
called the “Global Mining Initiative.”58 These mining companies pooled their 
influence and resources “to exercise an agenda-setting influence upon both the 
mining industry and its critics.”59 WBCSD prepared a recent report called Vision 
2050 to lay a pathway for a global population of nearly nine billion people to live 
within the resource limits of the planet by 2050.60 Although distinct, the elements 
 
53. DAVID SZABLOWSKI, TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND LOCAL STRUGGLES: MINING, COMMUNITIES AND 
THE WORLD BANK 82-83 (2007). 
54. Id.  
55. Id.  
56. KIRCHNER ET AL., supra note 18, at 43. 
57. Id. 
58. SZABLOWSKI, supra note 51, at 84-85. 
59. Id. 
60. Vision 2050: The New Agenda for Business – Executive Summary, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 1, http://www.wbcsd.org/pages/edocument/edocumentdetails.aspx?id=219&no 
searchcontextkey=true (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). This groundbreaking work is the culmination of an 18-
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of Vision 2050 illustrate “the interconnectedness of issues such as water, food 
and energy—relationships that must be considered in an integrated and holistic 
way, with tradeoffs that must be understood and addressed.”61 
Factoring in positive and negative externalities and carbon emissions with 
the cost of mining operations would assist national development goals as well as 
global norms for sustainable development.62 Land use planning of mining 
projects in conjunction with national goals for agriculture and land conservation 
would have to be considered.63 The omission of non-investment human rights and 
environmental rules by investment tribunals is significant.64 This absence of any 
reference to general environmental law principles in investor-state jurisprudence 
applies equally to sustainable development particularly in the context of human 
rights.65 The status of sustainable development is “rather unclear in international 
law” and “no consensus on whether it is a general principle of law producing 
substantive obligations, or a mere conceptual matrix, an objective, a process 
devoid of any law creating character” exists.66 
For sustainable development to enter the legal discourse, it is necessary to 
consider it on the national level and plan for it accordingly. Christian Kirchner 
asserts that “[c]entral planning of economics and social development is a 
commonly recognized and practiced policy in the Third World,” but Kirchner 
neglects to consider the sustainable development aspect of the planning process.67 
Riccardo Pavoni recognizes the importance of paying attention “to the 
 
month combined effort with CEOs and experts, and dialogues with over 200 companies and external 
stakeholders in 20 countries. The report spells out the “must haves”—the things that must happen over the 
coming decade to make a sustainable planetary society possible. These include incorporating the costs of 
externalities, starting with carbon, ecosystem services and water, into the structure of the marketplace; doubling 
agricultural output without increasing the amount of land or water used; halting deforestation and increasing 
yields from planted forests: halving carbon emissions worldwide (based on 2005 levels) by 2050 through a shift 
to low-carbon energy systems and improved demand-side energy efficiency, and providing universal access to 
low-carbon mobility. Id. 
61. Id. at 2. 
62. Roque Romero, Fostering the Positive Externalities of Mining—Policy Options, 15 CENTRE FOR 
ENERGY, PETROLEUM & MIN. L. & POL’Y 1, 3-4 (2005). 
63. KRISTAL MAZE ET AL., MINING AND BIODIVERSITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A DISCUSSION PAPER 1 
(2004), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_602.pdf. 
64. Riccardo Pavoni, Environmental Rights, Sustainable Development, and Investor-State Case Law: A 
Critical Appraisal, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 525, 528–29 
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009). 
65. Id. at 528. 
66. Id. at 528-29.  
67. KIRCHNER ET AL., supra note 18. A key component of development plans and programs is the 
reliability of information and statistics. Yet due to weak economic and administrative structures, the collection 
of such data is increasingly difficult. Rational planning necessitates development of plans that represent 
consistent extensions of earlier initiatives: “Formal planning, apart from its substantive objectives, can take on 
further significance as elements of political rationality that generally favors the development of an industrial 
economic structure. In some cases, therefore, the existence of formal planning alone may balance out many of 
the instabilities of political institutions.” Id. 
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relationship between investment law and the exercise of environmental 
participatory rights at the national level.”68 Pavoni states that public participation 
is “linked to other general principles, concepts, and requirements of vital 
importance, not only for environmental law, but also for the matter of 
international public policy.”69 
In Tajikistan, gold is not only a means of economic freedom, but political 
upliftment and social empowerment, which are earmarks of successful economies 
as well as democracies. According to a report by Safe Haven: Preservation of 
Capital, Kryso is an emerging mineral exploration company that seeks to explore 
gold and other precious and base metal deposits previously discovered in Central 
Asia, bringing them into production.70 Kryso was admitted to the AIM in 
December 2004 in order to continue funding the development of the Pakrut Gold 
Deposit, explore the Pakrut Licence Area, and obtain and acquire other gold and 
base metal deposits in Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia.71 Being listed as 
an AIM company is a milestone because, for the majority of junior mining 
companies listed on AIM, it means that “their analysis requires even more 
specialist technical information not typically required in analyzing industrial, 
financial, or service based smaller U.K. companies.”72 Kryso highlights its 
selection as the first foreign company to obtain a one hundred percent interest in 
a mining and exploration project in Tajikistan.73 In April 2004, LLC Pakrut, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Kryso, was granted a license and geological lease to 
explore and exploit the Pakrut License.74 This Pakrut area is reputed to have the 
second largest known gold resource after the Witwatersrand in South Africa.75 
IV. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY  
CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN NMP 
Prior to the actual investment, both the host nation and investor have 
converging interests for the establishment of the investment, but once a deal is 
struck, the dynamics between the relationship of the host nation and the investor 
are dramatically changed.76 The host nation has an incentive to unilaterally alter 
the original contract terms, amending investment laws, or even expropriating the 
 
68. Pavoni, supra note 64, at 545.  
69. Id.  
70. Kryso Resources PLC (London:KYS): New Recommendation, SAFE HAVEN: PRESERVATION OF 
CAPITAL (June 10, 2009), http://www.safehaven.com/article/13573/kryso-resources-plc. 
71. Id.  
72. UNDERSTANDING JUNIOR MINERS, AIM MINING RES. LTD. (Fiona Perrott-Humphrey ed., 2006). 
73. KRYSO, supra note 40. 
74. SAFE HAVEN, supra note 70. 
75. Id. 
76. SCHILL, supra note 51, at 3. 
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investor without compensation.77 This political risk results from opportunistic 
behavior that raises investment costs to the investor and may in an extreme cases 
block FDI entirely.78 
As a general principle of sovereignty, a state is under no legal obligation to 
permit investment within its borders, but once a state admits foreign investors, it 
is required to afford them “the protection of the law and provide for a certain 
standard of treatment.”79 Should the situation arise, the host nation cannot 
exercise its territorial sovereignty in an arbitrary manner.80 For example, in the 
United States, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) require that particular 
standards be upheld in the pre-entry stage.81 While the standards for national and 
most-favored-nation (“MFN”) treatment rely on the treatment accorded to a 
reference group, investment treaties can mandate standards of treatment on host 
states, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security, 
which are “absolute in character and grant protection to foreign investors 
independent of the host State’s treatment of its own nationals or of third-party 
nationals.”82 The obligation of national treatment has commanding influence in 
trade law for questioning differentiated treatment of goods based on 
environmental grounds.83 
Possible choices for applicable laws are based on the bargaining power and 
negotiating skills of the parties in creating investment contracts.84 The rules of 
admission, however, can pose requirements for the host nation, which may limit 
investor rights for dispute settlement if the investor ignores rules on admission.85 
Thus, violations of domestic law may place investments outside of substantive 
guarantees.86 Having an effective dispute settlement mechanism is “at the heart of 
any investment code.”87 Yet nations balk at enacting a firm dispute settlement 
 
77. Id. 
78. See id. at 3-5.  
79. Alexandra N. Diehl, Tracing a Success Story, or, “The Baby Boom of BITs”: Characteristics and 
Particularities of the Tight Net of Bilateral Investment Treaties Existing Today, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 7, 11 (August Reinisch et al. eds., 2008). 
80. Id.  
81. Id. (“Article 3 of the US Model BIT prescribes that each party shall accord to investors of the other 
party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances to its own investors with respect to 
establishment(!) [sic], acquisition, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments 
in its territory (so-called ‘national treatment’). Article 4 of the US Model BIT stipulates that ‘most-favored-
nation treatment’ should be accorded to the establishment phase as well.”). 
82. SCHILL, supra note 51, at 78. 
83. Romson, supra note 37, at 45.  
84. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 74 
(2008). 
85. Id. at 85. 
86. See id.  
87. Edward M. Graham, Towards an Asia Pacific Investment Code, in INVESTMENT ISSUES IN ASIA AND 
THE PACIFIC RIM 15, 29 (Carl J. Green & Thomas L. Brewer eds., 1995). 
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process because of the implications on national sovereignty.88 The two existing 
international bodies for investment disputes are the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), an entity of the World Bank, and 
the United National Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).89 
ICSID is an autonomous international institution whose primary purpose is to 
provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment 
disputes.90 UNCITRAL is the core legal body of the United Nations in the field of 
international trade law business and its business is the modernization and 
harmonization of rules on international business.91 ICSID and UNCITRAL, 
however, require that both the disputing firm and government consent to the 
resolution process, and even then, neither dispute resolution body can enforce the 
settlement.92 
A.  Deficiencies in Existing Norms for NMPs 
Mining acts usually fail to stipulate the time period from the date of 
application in which the granting authority must decide to grant or reject an 
exploration application.93 This missing timetable is important because delays 
occur in the process.94 More recent mining acts stipulate—either in the act or in 
the regulations—a maximum decision-making and processing time limit, and 
some acts even provide that if an application is not decided within a certain time, 
it is “deemed” to have been approved.95 Practically speaking, administrative 
procedures may not comply with the time limits set by the statute, but such limits 
may reduce the risk of indecision.96 Kryso has set a timetable to start mining on 
Pakrut gold deposits in 2014.97 Kryso expects that capacity for this project will be 
 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank. org/ICSID/ 
Index.jsp (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (“ICSID sought to remove major impediments to the free international 
flows of private investment posed by non-commercial risks and the absence of specialized international 
methods for investment dispute settlement. ICSID was created by the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States as an impartial international forum providing 
facilities for the resolution of legal disputes between eligible parties through conciliation or arbitration 
procedures.”). 
91. About UNCITRAL, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about 
_us.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
92. Graham, supra note 87, at 29. Procedures for the ICSID and UNCITRAL have been criticized for 
being legalistic and biased in favor of nations. Id. at 30. 
93. JAMES OTTO & JOHN CORDES, THE REGULATION OF MINERAL ENTERPRISES: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMICS, LAW AND POLICY 3-19 (2002). 
94. Id.  
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. V. Zhavoronkova, British Company to Start Gold Mining in Tajikistan, TREND, (Oct. 31, 2012), 
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660,000 tons of ore per year and is expected to grow up to 1.32 million tons per 
year in 2017.98 This timetable and generation capacity may be upset due to 
political and social instability in the country, which is why a viable NMP is 
crucial. 
Mining acts do not always make clear which official has the power to grant 
an exploration right, because in some acts, the granting power may reside with 
the “government” or with several levels of government.99 Unless another act 
clearly identifies the government officer authorized to make the grant on behalf 
of the government, difficulties can arise when several agencies or levels of 
government vie for control.100 In most nations, the granting of a mining right in 
most nations “does not convey the state’s or people’s ownership interest in in situ 
minerals to the mining right holder.”101 This nuance demonstrates the state’s 
intent to maintain “permanent sovereignty over its mineral endowment.”102 A 
mining lease or concession simply grants a right to a mine, as opposed to a real 
property interest in the minerals underground.103 
Modern investment protection does not effectively empower arbitral 
tribunals on the procedural and institutional level.104 The vagueness of underlying 
substantive investor rights impedes FDI: “[b]oth wording and concept of standard 
guarantees, such as indirect expropriation, fair and equitable treatment or full 
protection of security, are of such indeterminacy that they lack hard and 
ascertainable normative content.”105 
B. Taxation Issues 
Taxation consequences of international investment regimes also bear upon 
national policy. The structure of the fiscal regimes can be described as profit-
based fiscal regimes and revenue-based regimes.106 The profit-based regimes 
depend upon corporate income tax and dividend withholding tax, while revenue-
 
http://en.trend.az/capital/business/2082589.html. 
98. Id. 
99. OTTO & CORDES, supra note 91, at 3-25. “In most [recent] mining acts, the unrestricted transparent 
power to grant an exploration right is clearly given to a titled officer, usually an official in the ministry 
responsible for the mines. . . . [Yet n]ot all mining acts require a grant of exploration rights by a government 
officer. [This] right may appear as a general nonexclusive right under the mining act automatically upon mere 
completion of a registration process.” Id. at 3-25. 
100. Id.  
101. Id. at 3-44. 
102. Id.  
103. Id.  
104. SCHILL, supra note 51, at 263. 
105. Id. 
106. KOH NAITO & FELIX REMY, MINING SECTOR REFORM AND INVESTMENT—RESULTS OF A GLOBAL 
SURVEY 72 (2001). 
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based regimes depend upon royalties, import and export duties, and value-added 
taxes (“VAT”).107 On account of market fluctuations in profitability under 
cyclically changing international mineral prices, mining investors prefer profit-
based tax regimes.108 In Latin America, successful mining reform countries have 
made the switch from revenue-based to profit-based systems, but many countries 
continue to apply schemes based on output or input taxes such as royalties, 
custom duties, VAT, and employment taxes.109 Analysts that support preferential 
tax treatment for mineral investors propose that mining risks are “sufficiently 
different in magnitude and character to justify special consideration.”110 Risks in 
the mineral industry “are expressed as geological, commercial, or political factors 
beyond the control of investors or inherent in the decision-making process.”111 
Even if a potentially good mine is discovered, a lengthy wait can be expected in 
between discovery and exploration, and during that time, market factors can 
impact project economies.112 As the host country, Tajikistan “has an interest in 
the realization of a continuous and steady income stream to serve as the basis of 
reliable long-term economic planning,” but on the national level, it is important 
for policymakers to be mindful that “short-term economic opportunities usually 
cannot be exploited if they imply risking a future minimum income level.”113 
C. International Corporate Social Responsibility 
International investment law, like general international law, should address 
the concept of International Corporate Social Responsibility (“ICSR”) in the 
development of laws, rules, procedures, and decision-making. ICSR obligations 
are “the quid pro quo for the protection of investors and investments under 
international investment protection agreements and international economic rules 
such as of the WTO.”114 ICSR is a separate concept than governance, which 
describes “the organization of ownership, participation, disclosure and decision-
making in corporations.”115 ISCR regards the wider relationships between the 
business entity and social actors.116 Peter Muchlinski argues “the interaction of 
the two concepts is significant from the perspective of putting ICSR into 
 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. OTTO AND CORDES, supra note 93, 7-9. 
111. Id. at 7-10. 
112. Id. 
113. ERICH SCHANZE ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PART 2: ANALYSIS OF 
PROJECT AGREEMENTS 112 (1981). 
114. Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 637, 643, 645 n.21 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
115. Id. at 645. 
116. See id. 
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operation.”117 Muchlinski proposes that one way to ensure corporate 
responsibility for employment rights or health and safety would be to incorporate 
worker participation and consultation within the firm through laws that require 
the establishment of works councils or the placement of worker representatives 
on the company board.118 
Tajikistan still has a patterned record for human rights, so labor programs 
should be designed to improve development in this area.119 At the grassroots 
level, education for high school and university students to inform them of the 
necessity of human rights and the sustainable development of Tajikistan is 
another core problem.120 Human rights reports generally praise Tajikistani 
students’ openness and eagerness to discuss human rights, even though the Tajik 
government considers human rights a taboo subject121 
D. Towards a Viable NMP 
Models for mining policies for countries similarly situated to Tajikistan 
include Malawi, Kazakhstan, and Ghana.122 For example, in southern Africa, a 
region that is also mineral-rich, like Tajikistan, but poverty-stricken, the 
discussion of mining policies and stakeholder participation is already taking 
root.123 The Kryso gold exploration project in Pakrut is critical even though 
London-based Kryso is not a substantially large company. So much is at stake 
with this venture, including how company and local stakeholders will benefit 
from the investment. Tajikistan’s central government should also include 
safeguards in its NMP for the formulation of investment contracts. Poor contracts 
may undermine the government’s legitimacy among its people “if the contracts 
create the impression that the state is corrupt or incapable of looking after the 
interests of the country as a whole.”124 Poor contract terms allow corruption to 
fester by enabling extractive firms too much power in the nation’s internal affairs 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. George Camm, Human Rights in Tajikistan: Don’t Even Mention It, INSIDE THE COCOON: CENTRAL 
ASIA TODAY (Aug. 26, 2011, 2:59 AM), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64096. 
120. See generally US DEP’T OF STATE, TAJIKISTAN 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204625.pdf. 
121. Id. 
122. Nesbitt, supra note 28. 
123. For example, an effective policy in the southern African development community will engineer the 
delicate balance between poverty reduction and an internationally competitive minerals sector. This balance 
enhances the possibility of long-term economic growth and development in the SADC region. The overriding 
advantage of this strategy is that it generates home-grown policy instruments and implementation of mineral 
law with which stakeholders can identify. See H.D. Mtegha et al., National minerals policies and stakeholder 
participation for broad-based development in the southern African development community (SADC), 31 
RESOURCES POLICYPOL’Y 4, 231-38, (2006). 
124. Rustad et al., supra note 26, at 10550. 
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and allowing extractive firms to engage in unsustainable resource use.125 On the 
other hand, better contracts may “stipulate improved conditions for workers; 
establish stricter environmental and social safeguards; and include provisions for 
local development projects, such as the construction of schools, wells, and 
roads—all of which provide tangible peace dividends for local populations.”126 
The national government must negotiate its position when allowing mining 
firms to explore and extract within its border. The government cannot give away 
its resources and have less money to construct and maintain infrastructure, 
schools, and other facilities.127 In negotiating contracts, the government must also 
consider the possibility of environmental disaster and should develop emergency 
cleanup plans. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The sustainable mining practices and policies discussed in this Article, in the 
context of international investment legal regimes, show the impetus for a viable 
NMP. Despite the high market demand for gold, unsustainable investment 
techniques have hindered Tajikistan’s mining enterprises and accelerated 
environmental degradation.128 As a caveat, the mining industry must be regulated 
and security measures implemented to protect the business integrity of any gold 
mining projects.129 Similar to any major development project, the risk of 
environmental degradation and economic exploitation are elevated.130 While 
multi-national entities may in the future be able to extract and export gold from 
Tajikistan, others will also seek the rewards of this multibillion-dollar annual 
trade, including rebels, drug cartels, and common criminals.131 Nonetheless, 
Tajikistan with its large and hidden gold reserves could be a serious contender on 
the gold commodity market, and a viable NMP, could stimulate Tajikistan’s 
mining investment projects so that it encourages sustainable FDI. 
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